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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the extent to which legislators receive electoral benefits 
from altering the geographic distribution of federal outlays. Although there are both 
theoretical and anecdotal reasons to believe in the existence of such benefits, previous 
empirical work has largely failed to verify the connection between pork-barreling and 
reelection. We examine House incumbents during the 1980s, when budget deficits were 
allegedly forcing legislators to end the acquisition of distributive benefits, and we discover 
that legislators did in fact reap electoral benefits from pork-barreling in the 1980s, just 
as they did in the 1950s and 1960s. We further discover that there is a sharp partisan 
difference in the marginal· effects of federal outlays: additional federal monies strongly 
affect Democratic reelection margins but barely impact the electoral fortunes of Repub­
licans. This conclusion has important implications for recent debates about Congress, 
divided government, and the recent Republican takeover of Congress. 
Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits: 
Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 
1980s* 
R. Michael Alvarez Jason Saving 
As former House Speaker Tip O'Neill used to say, "All politics is local." This is usually 
taken to mean that representatives pay a great deal of attention to the concerns of their 
geographic constituents, since they wield ultimate control ov:er a Congressional career. 
Paying attention to the district back home can take many forms: voting the district's 
interests on policy issues (Bianco 1994); being an ombudsman for constituents fighting 
the Washington bureaucracy (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987); or bringing distributive 
benefits to the district (Ferejohn 1974). 
What is surprising, however, is the lack of empirical support for a positive relation­
ship between paying attention to the home district and incumbent reelection prospects. 
There is weak evidence that constituents pay attention to the legislative actions of their 
representatives (Alvarez and Gronke 1995; Stone 1979). Also, the evidence linking con­
stituency service to electoral success is not strong (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; 
Johannes and McAdams 1981). Last, the evidence for political manipulations of distribu­
tive benefits is mixed (Anagnoson 1980; Chernick 1979; Gist and Hill 1984; Rundquist 
1978; Rundquist and Griffith 1976). 
That a strong and clear relationship between distributive benefits and electoral suc­
cess has not yet been shown is even more surprising in light of recent .theoretical debates 
about the institutional organization of Congress. Informational theories of congressional 
organization assert that the transmission of information is the key reason for the struc­
ture we observe in the contemporary Congress, while distributive theories assert that the 
structures exist to support the electoral needs. of-members .{Krehbiel J991; Shepsle and 
Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Some see political manipulations of dis­
tributive benefits as a critical test between these competing models (Alvarez and Saving 
1995). 
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their support of his research through a Faculty Fellowship. The data used in this paper are available 
from the au th ors via anonymous FTP. 
In this paper we provide new evidence which strongly supports the hypothesis that 
House incumbents rely upon the pork barrel to facilitate their reelection bids. This is 
true even though we use data taken from three election cycles during the 1980's, a time 
when the discretionary portions of the federal budget were tightening and legislators were 
under fire to exercise control over an exploding budget deficit. Additionally, we show that 
Republicans and Democrats face different incentives with respect to the political pork­
barrel, and these differences suggest that the extent to which distributive benefits are 
available to legislators depends upon which party holds the majority in Congress. 
1 Deficits, Democrats and the Pork Barrel 
The two classic studies of the congressional pork barrel focused on large-scale federal 
projects (Maas 1951; Ferejohn 1974). In these systematic studies of specific distributive 
policies, solid evidence of the political manipulation of these projects was found, but 
only through the early 1960's. Other examinations of grant programs (Arnold 1979; 
Plott 1968; Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975; Strom 1975) and defense programs (Goss 
1972) from roughly the same time period found similar evidence of pork barreling. 
But studies of later periods have had more trouble finding systematic evidence of 
political manipulation of distributive benefits. There is a long line of work discounting 
the political pork barrel (Anagnoson 1980; Chernick 1979; Gist and Hill 1984; Rundquist 
1978; Rundquist and Griffith 1976). More recent analyses have disputed those conclu­
sions, but still, in more recent time periods there is not strong evidence of congres­
sional pork barreling (Alvarez and Schousen 1993; Bickers and Stein 1994; Feldman and 
Jondrow 1984; Mebane 1992). 
These contradictory findings raise important questions about the ability of legislators 
to engage in pork barrel activities. The first of these questions focuses on the political­
economic context of budgetary policy. For, these studies seem to ignore the massive 
changes which have occurred in the process of budgeting. Before the 1974 Budget Con­
trol and Impoundment Act, the process of authorizing and appropriating allowed for 
changes in distributive programs without incurring significant political or economic costs 
(Wildavsky 1988). But after 1974, the process fell apart under the weight of Washington 
politics and skyrocketing entitlement spending. The added layers of complexity in the 
budgeting process, the increased politicization of the budget, and the increasing size of 
the deficits, probably placed serious constraints on opportunities for representatives to 
pork barrel. Thus, .if opportunities.to .. engage.in .distributiv.e politics diminished after 
1974, the mixed results observed in the literature make more sense. 
A second question focuses on the legislators themselves, since these studies have done 
little to recognize that legislators differ in their abilities to engage in distributive politics.1 
1 Bickers and Stein (1994) rightly question studies which have not allowed for representatives to differ 
in their motivation for distributive benefits for their district. Alvarez and Schousen (1993) argue that 
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As to their abilities, in any particular Congress, members will differ in the skills they 
use to channel disproportionate shares of distributive benefits back to their constituents. 
That is, via knowledge of the legislative process, or through institutional position, some 
representatives are better able to use the system for the benefit of the home district. In 
fact, members of power and constituency committees do obtain statistically higher levels 
of federal outlays to their districts, controlling for district demand and other political 
variables (Alvarez and Saving 1995). 
Another major problem in this literature is the measurement of distributive benefits. 
One of the best definitions of distributive benefits says that they "are characterized by 
the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit more 
or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule" (Lowi 1964, p. 690). 
As applied to pork barreling, distributive benefits are those obtained by representatives 
who use their political influence to obtain spending in their districts over and above that 
which they might obtain were universalistic criteria applied. 
So, one issue regarding the measurement of distributive benefits is that they should 
be allocated through non-universalistic criteria. This implies that there are a number of 
federal disbursements which should not be included in measures of distributive benefits. 
For example, programs which are tied to economic conditions, like the various federal wel­
fare or unemployment assistance plans, are probably not ones which should be included 
in measures of the pork barrel. Additionally, mandatory entitlement spending, like social 
security benefits, should also be excluded since these programs are administered outside 
the normal congressional budgetary process and are unlikely to be subject to significant 
political manipulation. In short, the focus should be on federal discretionary spending, 
which is known to be tied closely to demands for federal disbursements from geographic
areas (Stein 1991; Rich 1989). . 
Another measurement issue arises when a particular program is initiated in a con­
gressional district. Much of the past work in this area has focused on total spending in 
congressional districts in certain categories, regardless of whether a program was initi­
ated in the current electoral cycle or decades earlier (e.g. Alvarez and Schousen 1993). 
However, the focus on total outlays, which includes continuing outlays from programs 
initiated earlier, runs the risk of biasing results towards the finding that political manip­
ulation of distributive benefits does not occur. For example, if we look at total outlays 
in some congressional district in 1988 for a particular program, the total allocated would 
be the sum of continuing awards still in existence and new awards for the current year. 
If the program had been in existence since 1975, and had been allocating awards to the 
district since then; -the awards in previous years·may have been influenced by other con­
gressional incumbents, or by the same incumbent in a different situation. This would 
seriously damage our chances of finding a relationship between the actions of the current 
partisan images make it easier for Democratic incumbents to engage in pork barreling and to gain 
electoral support as a result than Republicans. A different argument is made by Alvarez and Saving 
(1995), who show that institutional position (mainly committee membership) plays an important role 
in determining the variation in distributive benefits across congressional districts. 
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incumbent and the current flow of outlays to the district. 
The last measurement concern is whether it is better to examine discrete program 
numbers, or the total amount spent in the district in each program. In Lowi's definition 
of distributive benefits, a critical component is the discreteness of the benefit; that is, 
whether it can be divided into bundles which can be allocated to certain individuals 
or geographic areas. This, combined with the assumption that voters are more likely 
to monitor the discrete numbers of programs in the district, has led some to advocate 
program numbers as valid measures of the federal pork barrel (Bickers and Stein 1994). 
However, others have asserted that voters may monitor dollar amounts instead, under 
the assumption that they would prefer a program in their district with a large dollar 
amount to a program with a small dollar amount (Alvarez and Saving 1995; Alvarez and 
Schousen 1993; Feldman and Jondrow 1984). 
These questions in the literature about the federal pork barrel can be resolved empir­
ically, which is the subject of the remaining sections of this paper. But first, the various 
criticisms leveled above about past research generate a series of hypotheses which will be 
tested below: 
Hypothesis 1: House incumbents rely on the federal pork barrel in their bids for re­
election during recent years just as they did during the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Even though the budgetary game has changed since 1974, and even though the federal 
deficit placed serious constraints on increases in discretionary spending during the 1980s, 
it is quite likely that House incumbents have changed their strategies and have found ways 
to maintain their abilities to engage in pork barrel activities. Therefore, by providing 
evidence that the pork barrel positively influences incumbent reelection success during 
the 1980s, we will show that the reason for the contradictory findings of recent research 
on the pork barrel does not lie in changes in the budgetary realities of congress. 
Within this hypothesis, a number of derivative hypotheses can be tested as well: 
Hypothesis lA: New outlays and programs should have a greater influence on incum­
bent reelection bids than outlay totals and program totals. 
Hypothesis lB: New outlays measured by dollars should have a greater influence on 
incumbent reelection vote margins than the sheer number of new programs. 
These ancillary hypotheses all flow from the discussion above. That new outlays and 
program numbers should have a greater impact on incumbent reelection success relies 
upon the argument that the total flow of disbursements to a district or state in a particular 
year is really the summation of the past pork barrel activities of other incumbents or the 
same incumbent in possibly a different political situation. Thus, measures of new outlays 
or new program totals should have a stronger influence on incumbent reelection vote 
shares. That new outlay dollar totals matter more than the number of new programs 
depends upon the assertion that voters are more likely to monitor the sheer flow of money 
into the district, rather than the discrete number of programs. 
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But, the 1994 congressional elections ended a forty-year Democratic dynasty in the 
House of Representatives. To an extent rarely seen in American politics, Republican 
challengers ran and won on a unified national platform whose rhetoric suggested that 
the end of pork-barrel politics was near. But is there any reason to believe that the 
Republicans will abolish or curtail the acquisition of distributive benefits? 
Previous work suggests that the political pork-barrel will continue unabated. Dis­
tributive theory argues that Congress is characterized by a norm of universalism - that 
is, every representative obtains distributive benefits (Shepsle and Weingast 1981, Niou 
and Ordeshook 1985). To the extent that this is the case, a Republican majority should 
not affect the prevalence of distributive benefits. The work of congressional observers 
such as Fenno (1973, 1978) and Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) supports the central 
observations of distributive theory, arguing that every representative is aided by the ac­
quisition of distributive benefits so no representative has an incentive to abolish them. 
Finally, a revisionist view of political parties articulated by Cox and McCubbins (1992) 
holds that, while the beneficiaries of the political pork-barrel may shift from Democratic 
to Republican legislators, a change in party control will not endanger the pork-barrel 
itself: 
In our view, congressional parties are a species of legislative cartel. These 
cartels usurp the rule-making power of the House in order to endow their 
members with differential power . . . and to facilitate and stabilize legislative 
trades that benefit their members. Most of the cartel's efforts are centered 
on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members (p.278). 
Thus, previous work may be summarized by three statements, each of which is equiv­
alent: that the structure of the legislature will reflect the interests of its members, that 
every legislator would reap electoral benefits by pork-barreling, and that no legislator 
would ever want to abolish the pork-barrel. 
Yet, this consensus may be premature. Consider a legislature whose members belong 
to one of two political parties and suppose that, for whatever reason, the incumbents 
of one party receive more votes per dollar of pork than incumbents of the other party. 
Then a legislative structure designed to promote representation by members of the former 
party would encourage the political pork-barrel but a legislative structure designed to 
promote representation by members of the latter party would discourage the political 
pork-barrel. 
In particular, suppose it were the case that Democratic incumbents receive a higher 
marginal benefit from pork-barreling than otherwise equivalent Republican incumbents. 
Then a legislative structure characterized by pork-barrel politics would tend to increase 
Democratic representation and decrease Republican representation. This implies that 
a change in majority-party status could have substantial implications for the political 
pork-barrel in Congress. 
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We propose the following hypothesis about the electoral consequences of the pork 
barrel during the 1980s: 
Hypothesis 2: Members of the Democratic Party will receive greater marginal electoral 
benefits from pork-barreling than members of the Republican Party. 
This hypothesis has, as we have discussed, a great deal of relevance, both to legislative 
theorists and to the changes that might be wrought by a Republican Congress. Next, we 
turn to the research design we use to test these hypotheses. 
2 Research Design 
These hypotheses are tested in this paper with empirical models of incumbent vote shares 
in three electoral cycles during the 1980s. Restricting our attention to only incumbent 
elections during the 1980s allows for an initial test of whether the changes in the political 
economy of the budgetary process in recent history have influenced the ability of House 
members to engage in significant pork barrel activities. If the changes in the structure 
of the budgetary process and the constraints of an increasing ·budget deficit have placed 
serious constraints on the ability of House members to engage in pork barrel activities, we 
would expect to find that the amount of federal discretionary outlays to a congressional 
district would not factor strongly into the incumbent's vote share. But if the pork barrel 
is alive and well in the 1980s, this strongly suggests that members have been able to alter 
their strategies under the changed rules of the budget process. 
Then, the ancillary hypotheses (Hypothesis lA and lB) really are concerned with 
testing specifically the way in which pork barreling matters in incumbent elections. Sur­
prisingly little is known about the empirical details of the electoral significance of con­
gressional distributive politics, aside from recent work by Stein and Bickers (1994) . Their 
primary contributions were to argue that the lack of strong findings in past work stem 
from poor specification of measures of pork barreling and from a lack of understanding 
of how the electorate perceives the distributive actions of their representatives. In par­
ticular, they argued that one primary flaw in past work has been that researchers have 
failed to consider whether the number of awards or the dollar amounts of awards are 
critical for incumbent electoral success. While Stein and Bickers argue for the number of 
new awards as the appropriate operationalization of the congressional pork barrel, they 
never compare empirically the effects of awards versus dollars. Neither did they test 
their assertion that incumbents get more bang for the buck out of new awards than for 
existing flows of awards. Both of these assertions are tested rigorously below. 
3 Measures and Analysis 
To test these hypotheses, a set of measures of distributive benefits is first required. This 
study draws upon the federal outlays data contained in the Federal Assistance Awards 
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Data System (FAADS), originally collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. This 
database, collated and made available in a useable form by Bickers and Stein (1991), 
contains records of awards from each federal domestic spending program at the con­
gressional district level, back to 1983. A wide array of information about the annual 
expenditures in each congressional district for each program award is available; here we 
draw upon a number of measures of federal outlays: 
• Outlays in each district
• New outlays in each district
• Number of awards in each district
• Number of new awards in each district
In calculating each measure of outlays to each district, we included only discretionary 
outlays. In other words, outlays for the major entitlement programs - Social Security, 
Medicare, Food Stamps, and the like - are excluded from the above measures. Given 
they are entitlements, they should not be subject to much political manipulation once 
enacted, and so should not be included in measures of the pork barrel. 
Also, the distinction between total outlays or awards and new outlays or awards 
needs to be made clearly. The former are continuing awards, which represent the annual 
allotments made in a district under a program which has been previously awarded. In 
contrast, a new award occurs once a recipient in a congressional district first is granted 
money under a specific program. This distinction is important since continuing outlays 
and awards might not measure current pork barrel activities as well as new outlays and 
awards (see Hypothesis lA, above). 
Table 1 describes the distribution of various measures of the political pork-barrel. 
As is evidenced by the table, there are enormous differentials across districts in pork­
barrel expenditures. For example, the dollar value of new real outlays to districts varied 
from about one hundred million dollars to over five-and-a-half billion dollars, and the 
number of new programs to districts ranged from a mere 23 to well over seven thousand. 
The standard deviations (a billion dollars and seven hundred programs, respectively) 
demonstrate that apparent differences across districts are in fact widespread, and are not 
simply a function of a few outliers. 
Of course, since we are examining the effects of pork barrel behavior by House incum­
bents on their election prospects, it is first important to specify the dependent variable in 
the analysis. Here, incumbent vote margins from races in which incumbents faced some 
challenge in three elections (1984, 1986, and 1988) are used as the dependent variable. 
Next, testing the hypotheses - all revolving around predictions about the effect of 
distributive benefits on incumbent election successes - outlined above requires a model 
7 
of House elections with an appropriate set of control variables. In the literature on 
House elections a number of variables have been shown to have substantial influences 
on incumbent vote margins. To control for the effect of elite expectations we use a 
measure drawn from the October ratings of House races by Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Review; operationalized as a seven-point scale where 1 means the challenger 
is thought likely to win and where 7 means the incumbent is almost certain to win, 
this variable should have a strong positive impact on incumbent vote margins. Also, the 
normal vote in a district, measured as the average of the votes received by the challenger's 
party in the previous Senate, House, gubernatorial and presidential elections in the past 
six years, should influence incumbent electoral margins negatively. The incumbent's 
party should also influence incumbent electoral successes; membership in the majority 
party (coded as a binary variable with 1 for Democrats) should increase the incumbent's 
vote share in this period. Next, campaign spending is an important determinant of 
incumbent electoral success, and we operationalize the incumbent's campaign spending 
share as the percentage of expenditures made by the incumbent, which should have a 
positive effect on incumbent vote margins. The economy is thought to affect congressional 
elections, and to control for that we include a measure of real income change as the 
change in state-level real disposable income in the past year. Further, the quality of 
the challenger influences the vote shares of incumbents, and we measure this with an 
eight-level measure of challenger quality based on their past electoral experience. With 
high-quality challengers given higher scores on this scale, a negative relationship between 
this variable and incumbent vote shares is expected. Last, a dummy variable is included 
in the model to control for the effects of scandal in the current electoral cycle. 
These controls all form the baseline House incumbent model. Then, we add different 
operationalizations of pork barreling variables to test the various hypotheses about the 
effect of the pork barrel on incumbent vote margins. The first set of models examines 
the relative effectiveness of new versus existing awards, both in dollar amounts and in 
number of awards. Also, these models examine the relative effects of dollar amounts and 
numbers of awards on incumbent vote margins. The second and third sets of models, 
then, are similar except that the second looks at project grants and the third at formula 
grants. The fourth set of models examines the interaction between partisanship and pork 
barreling. 
4 The Pork Barrel and Incumbent Voting 
The first set. ,of hypotheses we wish ·to ,test in· this pa;per -focus ·generally on whether 
the pork barrel is politically relevant for incumbent House members in the 1980s. The 
more specific hypotheses we outlined above concern the specific details of which type of 
pork barrel activities House incumbents get the most credit for during their reelection 
bids: whether existing pork barrel expenditures outweigh new expenditures; whether the 
electorate seems to focus on the dollars spent by the federal government in the district 
or the number of new projects; and last whether incumbents get electoral bang out of 
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federal project grants or formula grants. 
In Table 2 we present six regression models which begin to answer these questions. 
Here we regress the control variables described in the previous section and different 
specifications of total outlays and program numbers in each district. Each specification 
includes a different operationalization of the federal pork barrel. . 
Notice first that these regression results resemble closely those previously published in 
the literature; all of the control variables have the expected effects on House incumbent 
votes, and they are all estimated precisely. Additionally, the fit of the regressions is quite 
good, with reasonably high adjusted R2 's and low regression standard errors. 
Next, the first four regression models in Table 2 each operationalize the federal pork 
barrel in different ways. Models 1 and 2 each look at the dollar totals of all existing federal 
programs in each district, with Model 1 including total real outlays and Model 2 only 
total new real outlays. Both these estimated coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant, showing that the federal pork barrel as measured in dollars spent in each 
district, did positively influence incumbent votes in the 1984, 1986 and 1988 election 
cycles. Additionally, notice that the estimated effectiveness �f new real outlays is over 
twice the magnitude of total real outlays. For a typical incumbent, this result means that 
increasing total federal outlays to their district by one hundred million dollars translates 
into only .056 percent more of the vote in each election, while increasing total new outlays 
by the same amount would give them . 17 percent more of the vote. 
Then in Models 3 and 4 we have operationalized the federal pork barrel as total 
numbers of programs (Model 3) and total new programs (Model 4). Both of these coeffi­
cients are statistically significant and positive, meaning· that numbers of new and existing 
programs also matter to voters during the 1980s. Here, it is interesting to compare the 
relative effects of existing numbers of programs with the estimated effects of new pro­
grams. In these results, the estimated effect of the number of new programs dramatically 
swamps that of existing programs - the estimated coefficient on number of new pro­
grams is almost five times greater than the estimated effect of all existing programs. For 
a typical incumbent, then, adding one thousand programs to their district yields .22 per­
cent more of the vote; but adding one thousand new programs gives them 1.04 percent 
more of the vote. 
So, these four regression models produce two impressive findings. First, we can clearly 
confirm that despite the constraints on the federal budget during the 1980s, and all of 
the changes to the budgetary process before and during that. period, _House incumbents 
are gaining electoral advantage by directing federal programs to their districts. There is 
no doubt that the federal pork barrel was alive and well during the 1980s. Second, we 
can also conclude that House incumbent benefit more by bringing new programs to their 
district than by maintaining high levels of existing programs. Across the four different 
operationalizations of pork barrel behavior it was clear that new programs (measured in 
dollars or program numbers) mattered much more for incumbent electoral success than 
existing programs. 
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But, are voters more interested in the dollar amounts or the number of new programs? 
There are two ways to answer this question. The first is to use the information in Table 
1 on the actual distribution of each of these operationalizations of pork barreling to see 
what the relative effects of new dollars and new programs are for House incumbents. 
During this period, a typical House incumbent receiving the minimum new dollars to her 
district would receive . 16 percent more of the vote, while a House incumbent receiving 
the maximum new dollars to her district would get 9.31 percent more of the vote - a 
difference of 9.15 percent of the vote. On the other hand, were this incumbent to get the 
minimum number of new projects she would receive .02 percent more of the vote, but 
would receive 7.60 percent more if she had the maximum number of new programs - a 
differences of 7.58 percent of the vote. Clearly, across the possible range of new dollars 
and new numbers of programs, incumbents can get more votes by maximizing the new 
dollars to their district. 
The second way to answer this question is to enter both new dollars and numbers of 
new programs into the same regression model. We do this in Models 5 and 6 of Table 2. 
In both models, while the estimated effects of real outlays or real new outlays measured 
in dollars does not change from the estimated effects in Models 1 and 2, the estimated 
effects of numbers of programs and numbers of new programs do drop considerably. In 
fact, the estimated effects of both numbers of programs and numbers of new programs are 
statistically insignificant. Thus, the evidence presented in Table 2 indicates that voters 
seem to bring information about the dollar amounts of incumbent pork barrel activities 
into the voting booth and not information about the number of programs the incumbent 
has brought to the district. 
It therefore appears that the number of programs is irrelevant to electoral success. 
Yet, this finding presents a sharp contrast to the work of Bickers and Stein [1994], who 
argue that it is the number of projects rather than the dollar amounts of those projects 
that influence voters. Given this, we decided to test the proper functional form of the 
two variables using the Box-Cox technique. 2 The test revealed an interesting difference 
between these variables, suggesting a linear formulation (parameter value of 0.88) for new 
dollars but a logged formulation (parameter value of 0.00) for new programs. Further 
regressions using the logged number of new programs in place of the number of new 
dollars yielded results that were qualitatively identical to the results of Table 2, and 
a combined regression similar to Model 6 of Table 2 revealed that both variables were 
highly significant. A summary of these results is presented in Table 3. 
2The Box-Cox technique estimates a form of the linear regression model: 
where 
y =a+ (Jg(x) + c: 
>. x>- -1 g (x) = -
,\
-. 
The Box-Cox technique estimates ,\, and that parameter gives the functional form for the particular x 
variable (or set of x's) . If,\= 1, the functional form is linear; if,\= 0, the functional form is log-linear;
and if,\= -1, the functional form is the reciprocal of x. 
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When both new dollars and logged new programs are included in a regression, as in the 
case of Model 10 of Table 3, both variables attain statistical significance. There are two 
possibilities about the true relationship between these variables: either they measure two 
distinct aspects of pork-barrel politics or else they measure the same aspect with different 
random shocks incorporated within them. Each of these possibilities is problematic for 
statistical analysis. If the variables measure different aspects of pork-barrel politics, then 
new dollars and logged new programs have qualitatively different effects on voters, and 
both should be included in statistical regressions. It is of course possible to develop 
stylized facts about this result, but there is neither theoretical nor anecdotal support for 
such a differentiation. If the two variables actually measure the same underlying aspect 
of pork-barrel politics, then the inclusion of both variables in statistical regressions could 
be a misspecification and any statistical inferences drawn from these regressions might 
be flawed. The results in Model 10 are consistent with both accounts, so in this form 
the data do not seem able to discriminate between explanations. However, one aspect 
of the estimated effects of new outlays and numbers of new programs in Model 10 is 
promising-when we use the appropriate functional form for numbers of new programs 
(log-linear) , this parameter becomes statistically significant, in contrast to the result in 
Model 6 (Table 2). We believe that this tips the scales towards the idea that these two 
variables measure different components of the political pork barrel; but further work is 
needed on this question. 
In order to test Hypothesis 2 (partisan heterogeneity in the effects of the pork barrel 
on incumbent election outcomes), we split our sample used in the previous regression 
models by political party and then compare the estimated coefficients across the two 
samples. These results are given in Table 4. 
The results of this table confirm the hypothesis that the political pork-barrel provided 
disproportionate electoral support to Democrats during the 1980s. The marginal effect 
of an additional dollar of federal outlays on incumbent vote share was approximately 
twice as large for Democratic incumbents as Republican incumbents. In fact, not one of 
the Republican coefficients were statistically significant at the . 10 level, which means we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that Republicans reaped no gains from pork-barrel politics 
during the 1980s. While it may be premature to conclude that Republicans do not 
benefit from the political pork-barrel, it seems clear that Republican incumbents were 
less dependent on the pork-barrel system than were incumbent Democrats during the 
1980s, when the Democrats were the House majority party. 
It is reasonable to ask whether this analysis suggests that the new Republican Congress 
will curtail or eliminate the political pork-·barrel. After all, if such an action would tend 
to increase Republican representation in Congress, why wouldn't the Republicans choose 
to pursue it? The answer lies in the self-interest of Republican incumbents. Before a 
Republican challenger is elected to Congress (i.e. when he is a candidate) , he has no 
reason to support the continuation of pork-barrel politics because he cannot obtain any 
pork for himself and he recognizes that abolition of the system is in the long-term in­
terest of the Republican party and Republican ideals. However, the calculus shifts when 
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the Republican challenger finds himself elected to Congress. He discovers that he can 
in fact reap electoral benefits through the political pork-barrel (although an otherwise 
identical Democrat would reap larger benefits) and that he would in fact incur electoral 
costs through the abolition of the political pork-barrel (although an otherwise identical 
Democrat would incur larger costs). Thus, while the abolition of the pork-barrel might 
well benefit the Republican party, the prospect of increased Republican representation in 
Congress may provide little comfort to the Republican incumbents who must voluntarily 
lessen their own probabilities of reelection in order to bring about such an increase. 
5 Discussion 
The results in Table 4 demonstrate that the politics of the pork barrel during the 1980s 
were crucially dependent on the political party of the officeholder. Democratic incum­
bents strongly benefited from the pork barrel, while Republicans benefited weakly or not 
at all. These findings speak to two important and related debates in the literature on 
Congress and legislative-executive relations. 
First, there has been a resurgence of interest in the power of the majority party in 
Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1992; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Our findings can 
be interpreted as a demonstration of one aspect of the power of the majority party -
the ability to direct disproportionate shares of distributive benefits to the districts of 
partisans. What we might be observing is some form of an equilibrium outcome, in 
which members of the House majority party receive greater distributive benefits than 
minority partisans and use those benefits to enhance their relations with constituents. 
This, however, is similar to arguments advanced by Jacobson (1990) to explain divided 
government. He argued that "Congressional candidates are evaluated on their personal 
character and experience and on their devotion to district services and local issues" (1990: 
115), which Democrats are particularly successful at exploiting. So, our results provide 
support for such a view on divided government (Alvarez and Schousen 1993), in contrast 
to the arguments advanced by Fiorina (1988). 
But our findings also suggest that the two political parties may have differential 
incentives to continue the system of pork-barrel politics that has characterized the modern 
House, although it need not be the case that members of the new Republican Congress will 
actually vote to curtail the political pork barrel. We have provided substantial evidence 
that the pork barrel survived the changes in the _process of budgeting and the constraints 
imposed on the budget by the huge deficits of the 1980s. Many have remarked at how 
successful the Republicans seem to have been in constraining the ability of Congress to 
use discretionary expenditures for political gain in the 1980s. Indeed, the results of our 
paper suggest a reason for them to do so - curtailment of the political pork-barrel will 
inflict disproportionate electoral harm on Democratic incumbents. However, our results 
do show that House incumbents have adjusted to the new realities of budget politics, and 
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that in many instances pork-barrel expenditures continue to be obtained and continue 
to influence the reelection prospects of incumbent legislators. 
What remains to be seen, however, is whether these same findings will hold with a 
reorganized Congressional institution and a new majority party in the House. Will the 
new House majority resist the temptation to use their new-found institutional power to 
bring home the the bacon to their constituents? Will the pork barrel wither and die 
under dramatic budget cuts? We are in the midst of a wonderful natural experiment, 
and within a few years we should be in a good position to examine again the effects 
of party and institution on the distribution of federal expenditures across Congressional 
districts. 
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Table 1: 
Measure Mean Min. Max. S.D. 
Real Outlays 22.8 6.98 126.5 11.6 
New Real Outlays 8.13 .96 55.1 5.00 
Number of Programs 1.89 .086 19.1 2.03 
Number of New Programs .63 .023 7.31 .71 
Real Project Outlays .90 .002 13.1 1.16 
New Real Project Outlays .45 0 9.98 .65 
Number of Project Programs .46 .005 7.32 .56 
Number of New Project Programs .23 .002 5.06 .30 
Real Grant Outlays 3.60 .37 58.1 5.50 
New Real Grant Outlays .99 0 24.7 1.86 
Number of Grant Programs .47 .001 14.9 .85 
Number of New Grant Programs .07 0 1.58 .15 
Note: Dollar amounts are in 100 millions; numbers of projects are 
in thousands. 
Table 2: House Incumbent Vote, 1984-1988; Federal Outlays (Monies and Program Totals 
by District) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 66.0** 65.9** 66.6** 66.2** 66.0** 65.9** 
1.86 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.86 1.84 
Real Outlays .056** .056** 
(100 Millions) .018 .027 
New Real Outlays .169** .132** 
(100 Millions) .042 .063 
Number of Programs .22** .002 
(Thousands) .10 .15 
Number of New Programs 1.04** .35 
(Thousands) .30 .44 
CQ Fall Rating .71** .73** .70** .70** .71** .72** 
.19 .19 .19 .19 .19 .19 
Normal Vote -.40** -.39** -.39** -.39** -.40** -.39**
.02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Inc. Party .71** .62 .78** .71* .71* .63 
.40 .40 .40 .40 .40 .40 
Inc. Spending Share 24.2** 24.1 ** 24.3** 24.4** 24.2** 24.2** 
1.30 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 
Real Income .19** .17* .20** .20** .19** .18* 
.09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 
Chal. Quality -1.13** -1.14** -1.15** -1.15** -1.13** -1.14**
.19 .19 .19 .19 .19 .19 
Scandal -8.37** -8.26** -8.32** -8.33** -8.37** -8.28**
1.40 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
1984 Intercept 2.20** 1.56** 2.21 ** 2.08** 2.20** 1.68** 
.53 .54 .54 .53 .54 .56 
1986 Intercept 1.41 ** 1.11 ** 1.29** 1.12** 1.41 ** 1.08** 
.48 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48 
Number of Cases 984 984 984 984 984 984 
ADJ-R2 .61 .61 .61 .61 .60 .61 
Mean Inc. Vote 67.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 
SE 5.83 5.81 5.85 5.82 5.84 5.81 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors. Monetary outlays are measured 
in millions; numbers of projects in thousands. The dependent variable is incumbent share of the 
two-party vote and the other variables are defined in the text. "**" denotes an estimate statistically 
significant at the p=.05 level and "*" at the p=.10 level, both two-tailed tests. 
Table 3: House Incumbent Vote, 1984-1988, with Logged Programs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Intercept 66.0** 65.9** 60.4** 61.0** 61.3** 62.2** 
1.86 1.83 2.59 2.33 2.69 2.43 
Real Outlays .056** .027 
(100 Millions) .018 .022 
New Real Outlays .169** .097* 
(100 Millions) .042 .053 
Logged Programs .87** .70** 
(Thousands) .24 .29 
Logged New Programs 0.94** .64** 
(Thousands) .22 .28 
CQ Fall Rating .71** .73** .70** .70** .70** .72** 
.19 .19 .19 .19 .19 .19 
Normal Vote -.40** -.39** -.39** -.39** -·.39** -.39**
.02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
Inc. Party .71* .62 .78** .72* .74* .64 
.40 .40 .40 .39 .40 .40 
Inc. Spending Share 24.2** 24.1** 24.5** 24.5** 24.5** 24.4** 
1.30 1.29 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.29 
Real Income .19** .17* .21** .21** .20** .19* 
.09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 
Chal. Quality -1.13** -1.14** -1.15** -1.16** -1.14** -1.15**
.19 .19 .19 .19 .19 .19 
Scandal -8.37** -8.26** -8.41 ** -8.32** -8.42** -8.29**
1.40 1.39 1.40 1.39 1.40 1.39 
1984 Intercept 2.20** 1.56** 2.62** 2.19** 2.58** 1.88** 
.53 .54 .55 .53 .55 .55 
1986 Intercept 1.41 ** 1.11 ** 1.17** 1.03** 1.23** 0.99** 
.48 .48 .48 .48 .48 .48 
Number of Cases 984 984 984 984 984 984 
ADJ-R2 .61 .61 .61 .61 .61 .61 
Mean Inc. Vote 67.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 67.7 
SE 5.83 5.81 5.82 5.82 5.82 5.80 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients followed by standard errors. Monetary outlays are measured
in millions; numbers of projects in thousands. The dependent variable is incumbent share of the 
two-party vote and the other variables are defined in the text. "**" denotes an estimate statistically 
significant at the p=.05 level and "*" at the p=.10 level, both two-tailed tests. 
Table 4: House Incumbent Vote, 1984-1988; New Federal Outlays and Majority Party 
Status (New Monies and New Program Totals by District) 
Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep 
Intercept 70.1** 54.3** 63.4** 51.5** 64.1** 52.6** 
2.17 2.66 2.83 3.40 2.99 3.60 
New Real Outlays .173** .103 .050 .074 
( 100 Millions) .055 .065 .069 .079 
Logged New Programs 1.22** .48 1.05** .27 
.29 .33 .36 .40 
CQ Fall Rating .41 .80** .32 .81** .34 .81** 
.26 .26 .26 .26 .26 .26 
Normal Vote -.43** -.27** -.43** -.26** -.34** -.81 **
.03 .04 .03 .04 . .03 .04 
Inc. Spending Share 20.1** 31.5** 20.5** 31. 7** 20.4** 31.6** 
1.63 1.99 1.62 2.00 1.62 2.00 
Real Income .27* -.02 .28** .01 .28** -.01 
.13 .12 .13 .12 .13 .13 
Chal. Quality -1.23** -.83** -1.22** -.86** -1.22** -.84**
.26 .25 .26 .25 .26 .25 
Scandal -8.88** -8.21 ** -8.94** -8.29** -8.93** -8.21 **
1.67 2.41 1.66 2.41 1.66 2.41 
1984 Intercept -.31 3.73** .44 4.05** .26 3.85** 
.71 .75 .70 .74 .74 .77 
1986 Intercept 2.02** .01 2.00** -.09 1.94** -.06 
.66 .68 .65 .69 .65 .69 
Number of Cases 560 424 560 424 560 424 
ADJ-R2 .64 .64 .64 .63 .64 .63 
Mean Inc. Vote 67.9 67.6 67.9 67.6 67.9 67.6 
SE 5.93 5.20 5.88 5.21 5.89 5.21 
Note: Entries-are regression coefficients followed by standard errors. Monetary outlays are measured 
in millions; numbers of projects in thousands. The dependent variable is incumbent share of the 
two-party vote and the other variables are defined in the text. "**" denotes an estimate statistically 
significant at the p=.05 level and "*" at the p=.10 level, both two-tailed tests. 
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